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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## 16 June 1986

Qadhafi's Shaky Domestic Position

## Summary

Libyan leader Qadhafi remains shaken by the US airstrike last April. The US attack has aggravated his unprecedented political problems by humiliating the Libyan armed forces and indirectly stimulating closer cooperation between Washington and West European governments to isolate his regime. Qadhafi's security forces, however, remain loyal and effective enough to protect him from all but the best-organized and skillfully implemented plots.

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## Impact of the US Attack

Domestic reactions to the US airstrike last April confirm Qadhafi's unprecedented political problems.

 Press reports indicate that the funeral procession in Tripoli for those killed in the attack attracted only several thousand marchers out of a local population of about 900,000.	
pro-Qadhafi demonstrationshighly publicized by the Libyan media have been stage managed by his radical supporters.	25X1
 popular criticism of Qadhafi has become more open since the US strike.	25 <b>X</b> 1

This memorandum was prepared by	the Maghreb
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Easte	
Asian Analysis. Information as of 16 June 1986 was	
preparation. Questions and <u>comments should</u> be addre	essed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division	
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	anti-
	Qadhafi graffitti recently appeared in Tripoli and Banghazi for the first time this year.
ces p ideno	shington's humiliation of the Libyan militaryLibyan proved unable to defend Qadhafi even at his best protected cestrengthens the political climate in Libyan that was conducive to plotting.
Qad	hafi's failure to attract significant foreign support for
antı	-US posture adds to his domestic vulnerabilities.
	Recent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist activities by West European governments and limits on the official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims of widespread international support and US isolation, as well as his denials of terrorist involvement.
	Libyans are
	relying on the VOA and BBC for accurate information because they recognize that the regime is disinforming them.
	In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene an extraordinary Arab League Summit has further undermined Qadhafi's attempts to persuade Libyans of US blame for the confrontation.
_	ountermeasures
ime C	hough the US airstrike has weakened Qadhafi's grip on

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		25 <b>X</b> 1
	coup protection forceor other domestic security elements.	25X
sycholo	addition, Qadhafi apparently has been given a limited gical lift by a recent Soviet commitment to strengthen an military capabilities against potential US attacks.	
	In our view, Qadhafi's renewed approaches to the Sovietshighlighted by Libyan number two man Jallud's visit to Moscow last monthprobably are intended in part to help shore up his domestic position.	
	The Libyan leader may regard increased Soviet military assistance as a prerequisite for undercutting dissent in the officer corps and rebuilding his international prestige.	
	Qadhafi might also perceive a major arms purchase as a means to revive traditional West European concerns over closer ties between Tripoli and Moscow and undermine the current Allied effort to isolate the Libyan regime.	
	The favorable Soviet response has increased Qadhafi's confidence enough to reassert his control over day-to-day developments, thereby discouraging at least some potential plotters.	25X
ppearan ithdraw	ertheless, the cancellation by Qadhafi of his public ce on ll Junea national holiday commemorating the 1970 al of US forces from Libyademonstrates the considerable he is under.	
	Qadhafi almost certainly decided on a televised appearance because he fears assassination if he appears publicly.	
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